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I. INTRODUCTION — 
 
  A major issue in the present dispute is the scope and effect of UCA §§ 10-9a-707 & 
801, which set forth the standards-of-review governing the review of land-use decisions. 
These statutes operate to control the flow of a land-use dispute essentially as shown in 
Figure 1. Note the continuity of the process: The matter is not an administrative action 
followed by a separate judicial 
one. Rather, the process 
defined by statute (itself 
derived from years of careful 
judicial direction and  
analysis) runs as one 
continuous process based on—
indeed driven by—“the record 
provided by the … appeal 
authority.” UCA § 10-9a-
801(8)(a)(i). Figure 1 shows 
that review by this Court, 
although after district court review, is not based upon the district court’s record, but upon 
the administrative record made before the City Council as the designated AppA.  
In short, this Court has before it the decision of the Grantsville City Council (“City 
â Land Use 
Authority (GPC) 
decision. 
ã Appeal Authority 
(City Council) 
review of the 
LUA decision.   
Record Created 
ä District Court 
review of the 
AppA decision. 
å Appellate Court 
review of the 
AppA decision. 
If local ordinance does not 
provide for a standard of 
review, the AppA must 
review the matter de novo. 
UCA § 10-9a-707(2). 
District Court review: 
Limited to the 
administrative record. 
UCA § 10-9a-801 (8)(a)(i) 
Appellate review: “as if 
… directly from the 
[AppA]” & subject to 
UCA § 10-9a-801. 
Patterson v. Utah County 
BOA, 893 P.2d 602, 603 
(Utah Ct. App., 1995).  
FIGURE 1. The Land-
Use Appeal Process. 
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Council”), not that of the district court. Except as a required prologue, the district court 
rulings upon which Pacific lays such stress have little or nothing to do with this Court’s 
analysis: the district court’s opinion is afforded neither deference nor any presumption of 
correctness, see Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995), since district court review of an administrative record boasts no particular 
advantages over the subsequent review by an appellate court. 
Because being bound to the record invalidates the improper claims it has raised for 
the first time on appeal, Pacific goes to extraordinary lengths to distance itself, and more 
particularly its claims, from § 801’s ban on nonrecord evidence. Its arguments become 
thus fairly predictable: Pacific didn’t have to raise every theory of relief (and, hence, may 
raise new arguments); there is no problem with subject-matter jurisdiction (and, hence, it 
may raise new arguments); it is Grantsville, not Pacific, which improperly raises new 
arguments (and, hence, Pacific may raise its new arguments); and so forth. 
Pacific’s conclusions, however, are entirely incorrect, as legal conclusions 
generally are when based upon erroneous premises. That they are erroneous—and 
seriously so—shall become obvious as we examine Pacific’s Response point by point. 
II. ON THE NATURE AND ADMISSIBILITY OF “INDEPENDENT” CLAIMS IN THE 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAND-USE DECISIONS. 
 
As the Court doubtless recognizes, after reviewing both Grantsville’s Opening Brief 
and Pacific’s Response, if LUDMA mandates limiting judicial review of local land-use 
decisions to the administrative record, see UCA § 10-9a-801(8), then the additional, 
claims being raised for the first time in a petition for judicial review are barred as not 
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having first been brought before the local administrative tribunal. In its Response, Pacific, 
as it must, characterizes these claims as entirely unrelated to—that is, “independent” 
from—its Petition for Review of Grantsville’s land-use decisions and hence not subject to 
UCA § 10-9a-801(8)’s record-only restriction.  See Response at 17–18. Pacific also 
attempts to distance its so-called “independent claims” from GCC § 3.22(6)’s every-
theory-of-relief requirement. See Response at 18.  
 Does UCA § 10-9a-801(8)’s ban on matters beyond the administrative record bar 
Pacific’s additional claims? Or are such claims outside the ambit of §-801, and therefore 
“independent” and freely raisable at any time? The answer is clearly, no. 
A. Pacific Misunderstands or Mischaracterizes LUDMA Appellate 
Structure to Ameliorate the Invalidity of Its Improper Claims. 
 
Pacific evidently perceives this matter as having begun in district court, as an 
entirely different proceeding from the administrative process below, making this Court’s 
reassessment, in Pacific’s mind, the first appeal of a district court decision, rather than the 
second appeal of an AppA decision pursuant to LUDMA and GCC. See Response at 13. 
However, the present controversy began with a hearing before the Grantsville City 
Planning Commission (“Planning Commission”) in January of 2007. Pursuant to the 
provisions of LUDMA (UCA § 10-9a-701(2)&(3)(a); GCC § 12.4(5)), the Planning 
Commission’s decision (as the relevant LAU) was appealed to the City Council (the 
relevant AppA). And each review—City Council, district court, this Court—has been the 
continuation of the ongoing process mandated by LUDMA, wherein each successive 
review of the Planning Commission’s decision is undertaken on the administrative 
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record, as if directly from the administrative body.  
It is thus Pacific’s self-labeled “independent” bona-fide–purchase and PUD-
termination claims—not Grantsville’s objections thereto—that were improperly raised for 
the first time on appeal in the district court, contrary to the plain language and process 
contemplated by both LUDMA and the GCC. Desperate to have its additional claims 
construed as entirely separate from its “land-use appeal,” Pacific has convinced itself that 
plain legislative language does not mean what it says. 
1. GCC § 3.22(6) requires Pacific to raise its every argument. 
 
 Pacific dismisses GCC § 3.22(6)’s clearly enunciated every-theory requirement1 as 
inapplicable, declaring that it “does not apply to Pacific[ but] only to a party bringing an 
appeal to the City Council.” (Response at 18.) Pacific argues it was not a petitioner for 
AppA review before the City Council and that, having prevailed before the Planning 
Commission, it was therefore not “adversely affected.” This position, although appearing 
reasonable at first blush, falls foul of both the law and various policy considerations.  
UCA § 10-9a-707(2) provides that “[i]f the municipality fails to designate a 
standard of review of factual matters, the appeal authority shall review the matter de 
novo.” The GCC has no designation of an AppA standard of review, and its review must, 
accordingly, start over again, de novo. Explaining de novo review in the context of justice 
and district courts, the Utah Supreme Court made it clear that  
[t]he state bears the same burden of establishing a defendant’s guilt in a 
                                                 
1 “In making an appeal, an adversely affected party shall present to the appeal authority 
every theory that it can raise in district court.” GCC § 3.22 (authorized by UCA § 10-9a-
701(4)(c): “By ordinance, a municipality may … require an adversely affected party to 
present to an appeal authority every theory of relief that it can raise in district court.”) 
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trial de novo as it would had the case originated there, and a defendant is 
afforded a clean slate upon which to relitigate the facts…. 
 
Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT 1, ¶31, 106 P.3d 707. In the present context, this premise 
obliged Pacific to meet the same burden and present all its defenses to the City Council.  
To think otherwise, acquiescing to the Pacific’s stiff, monolithic view of appellate 
structure, would be to gut UCA § 10-9a-707(2)’s “de novo” review of any meaning at all, 
since AppA review would then presume an LUA decision correct rather than conduct de 
novo review  and burden the petitioner with overcoming the presumption.  
[W]ell-established principle[s] of statutory construction[, however,] 
requir[e the Courts] to give meaning, where possible to all provisions of a 
statute…. “Any interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute 
inoperative or superfluous is to be avoided.” 
 
Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶23, 11 P.3d 277 (quoting State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 
(Utah 1995)) (emphasis added; citations, quotation marks, and one alteration omitted).  
Legislative command thus requires de novo review, which does not (indeed, by 
definition, cannot) partake of presumptions carried over from prior consideration, but 
must begin at the beginning, establishing the facts and applying the relevant law thereto 
on its own.  Such review required Pacific to raise all of its arguments again before the 
City Council, or chance having no case at all on appeal. Otherwise, a party who prevails 
before a LUA—and is thus not the “adversely affected” party—must be excused from 
having to raise any argument before the AppA, since it could essentially bring up every 
argument it wished to once the matter came before a judge. Indeed, to take advantage of 
this loophole-ambush strategy, such a party’s best course would be to keep utterly mum 
in front of the AppA, so as not to give away the legal theories upon which its district 
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court arguments will be based. 
2. District Court review is limited to the record made before the 
AppA, barring Pacific’s “independent” claims. 
 
The every-theory requirement of GCC § 3.22(6) and UCA 10-9a-701(4)(c), like 
the de novo default imposed by UCA § 10-9a-707(2), are logical corollaries of UCA § 
10-9a-801(8)’s record-only rule. That is, in order to recognize the duly organized 
administrative entities created by the Legislature, while minimizing as far as possible the 
expenditure of judicial resources, the law requires petitioners to use these administrative 
bodies to the full. As part of this exhaustion of remedies, see UCA § 10-9a-801(1), a 
record must be made of the process before the LUA or the AppA (if the AppA review is 
de novo) for the district courts to review. The every-theory rule ensures this record’s 
completeness, as the de novo requirement allows the broadest possible inclusion of 
evidence therein.  
What is not so obvious, apparently, is the scope of the record-only limitation. 
Pacific contends that its “independent” claims were subject to neither UCA § 10-9a-
801(1)’s exhaustion-of-remedies mandate nor the jurisdiction of the City Council as a 
LUDMA AppA, since the record-only rule “applies only in connection with a ‘review of 
agency action,’” but not to Pacific’s “BFP, statute of frauds, and termination of the PUD 
claims.” (Response at 25 n.5.) However, the record-only restriction does, in fact, apply to 
each of its “independent” claims, as the Utah courts have long since determined.  
i. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal. 
 
We begin by revisiting the refreshingly plainspoken Badger v. Brooklyn Canal 
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Co., 966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1998), which Pacific would distinguish, if it could, but which 
remains controlling law in the present dispute. The Badger Court analogized 
administrative agencies to trial courts in this regard and held that: 
Similarly, a party seeking review of agency action must raise an issue 
before that agency to preserve the issue for further review. It is well settled 
that ‘persons aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies “may not, 
by refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such agencies, by-
pass them, and call upon the courts to determine … matters properly 
determinable originally by such agencies.”’  
 
966 P.2d at 847 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted). 
But, says Pacific, that means only that matters pertaining to the administrative 
agency determination must be raised before such agencies; it does not require the 
inclusion of so-called “independent” maters. This makes very little sense in the present 
dispute, since Pacific’s BFP and PUD claims are directly related to its challenge to the 
AppA decision. After all, it would be a strange law that required a court to “determine 
only whether or not [a presumptively valid] land-use decision is arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal,” UCA § 10-9a-801(3)(a), but didn’t allow a challenger to explain why it is so.  
ii. Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Commission. 
In order to understand the correct place of what Pacific labels “independent” 
claims, we turn to Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT 74, 34 P.3d 180. 
Nebeker filed a petition for relief in district court, challenging the imposition of a 12% 
interest rate on Nebeker’s deficient taxes. Nebeker’s petition alleged that “Nebeker did 
not need to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking relief in district court 
because . . . the Tax Commission lacked jurisdiction to address [Nebeker’s] constitutional 
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claims.” 2001 UT 74 at ¶7. The District Court, however, dismissed Nebeker’s petition, 
ruling that “it [did] not have jurisdiction to grant the … petition for failure of the 
petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies ….” Id. at ¶8.   
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court addressed, inter alia, whether the district 
court had erred in dismissing Nebeker's petition for lack of jurisdiction, id. at ¶10, 
ultimately concluding that “the trial court correctly dismissed Nebeker's petition as 
Nebeker …. failed to raise [his] constitutional claims in the initial proceeding before the 
Tax Commission,” id. at ¶12. Though Nebeker argued that his constitutional claims could 
have been independently raised, the Court disagreed. Id. at ¶15. The Court initially noted 
that Nebeker must exhaust administrative remedies, even if there are constitutional 
questions, because pursuing the administrative action “might obviate the need of 
addressing [a constitutional] issue.” Id. at ¶16 (further quotation and citation omitted). 
The Court went on to conclude, in addition, that  
the district court could not have heard the constitutional claims [anyway,] 
because Nebeker failed to raise these claims in his initial proceeding before 
the Tax Commission. Having failed to raise the issue in the initial 
proceeding, Nebeker waived any opportunity to bring it later either 
before the district court or in another forum. 
 
Id. at ¶18 (emphasis added). 
In support, the Court listed three policy premises giving rise to these results:  
To begin, to hold otherwise would create procedural confusion and 
piecemeal litigation, as demonstrated by this very case. . . . This is true 
even though Nebeker must wait until the Tax Commission has ruled on all 
other issues to bring his constitutional claims in another court. 
 
…. Additionally, “Judicial attention to the constitutional issue, as well as 
other issues, will be better framed by the structure of a factual context” 
4812-7825-9459.GR058.001 9
developed before the agency. Lastly, to hold otherwise would give a 
petitioner a way to revive claims he had originally lost due to his own lack 
of diligence in failing to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
 
2001 UT 74, ¶¶19 & 20 (emphasis added internal citations omitted). 
Nebeker makes it plain that Pacific’s “independent” claims cannot be brought in a 
second lawsuit or treated separately in a single action, such as Pacific urges. As a result, 
by failing to raise its bona-fide purchaser, termination-of-PUD, and statute-of-frauds 
claims before the City Council, Pacific has “waived any opportunity to bring [them] later 
either before the district court or in another forum,” 2001 UT 74, ¶18. And, given the 
Nebeker Court’s emphasis on constitutional claims, Pacific’s appeal to an imaginary due-
process violation as a justification for its additional evidence, and the causes of action 
based thereon avails Pacific not at all.2 
III. GRANTSVILLE PROPERLY QUESTIONS THE JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IN 
THE PRESENT MATTER. 
 
A.  Standards Regarding Issues of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
 
This Court has often pointed out the universal rule that “questions regarding 
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time because such issues determine 
whether a court has authority to address the merits of a particular case.” Ameritemps, Inc. 
v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491, ¶10, 128 P.3d 31 (quoting Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 
2002 UT 28, ¶11, 44 P.3d 724). That a jurisdictional defect exists is a matter that cannot 
be waived (id. (citing Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,¶ 34, 100 P.3d 1177, and Barnard v. 
                                                 
2 The Nebeker Court’s reasoning, 2001 UT 74, ¶¶19 & 20, also makes short work of 
Pacific’s use of the venerable “parade of horribles” (Response at 24–26) and validates the 
fact that the every-theory mandate reduces the strain such matters would otherwise place 
on judicial resources and seconds the Legislature’s confidence in, and encouragement of, 
local administrative bodies to grapple with the law to the best of their ability. 
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Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993)), and a determination as to the existence of 
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness without 
deference to a prior District Court determination (Beaver v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, ¶8, 
31 P.3d 1147). Finally, “[w]hen a jurisdictional question arises, the burden to establish it 
rests upon the party asserting that jurisdiction exists.” Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 
1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (further citations omitted). 
B. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction May be Raised at Any Time. 
Pacific loftily reprimands Grantsville for being “oblivious to the preservation 
requirement and also to the jurisdiction exception” (Response at 15), but then, assuming 
an air of mild exasperation, admits that “since Grantsville now challenges the Court’s 
jurisdiction (albeit belatedly), that argument needs to be addressed on the merits 
regardless of the fact that it was not preserved in the district court” (id.).  
Aside from the fact that it is impossible to raise a matter “belatedly” which can “be 
raised at any time,” see Ameritemps, 2005 UT App 491, ¶10; and Snyder, 2002 UT 28, 
¶11, Grantsville did raise the inadmissibility of the Roope, Gibson, and Vanderheiden 
affidavits as well as the new causes of action for which they are the bases.3  [R. at 220 
and 301 at 3:10-23.] But Pacific ignores this fact, arguing throughout its Response that 
Grantsville somehow failed to comply with the rules. Response at 15 n.2, at 29, and so 
forth. In fact, however, Grantsville’s opening Brief plainly included citations to the 
record for each of its five issues in connection with Pacific’s improperly raising matters 
never brought before the City Council as the appropriate AppA. Opening Brief at 1–4. 
                                                 
3 A motion to strike was not mandatory to preserve the challenge of these affidavits. See 
Litster v. Utah Valley Cmty. Coll., 881 P.2d 933, 936 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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IV. GRANTSVILLE’S CHALLENGE TO PACIFIC’S NEW, NONRECORD CLAIMS IS 
BOTH SPECIFIC AND SUFFICIENT. 
 
To circumvent the ban against nonrecord claims, Pacific attempts to marginalize 
Grantsville’s jurisdictional objections, arguing that “Grantsville did not make these 
arguments in the district court but raises them on appeal for the first time.” Response at 
13. Pacific goes on to quote what it calls “the closest that Grantsville came to raising this 
argument in the trial court.” [R. at 301, 90:13–21 (quoted in Response at 13–14).] Having 
characterized this colloquy as Grantsville’s sole mention of this issue, Pacific proceeds—
in a superb example of the straw-man argument—to assert that (what they have quoted 
of) Grantsville’s objection fails to preserve the issue “in such a way that the trial court 
has an opportunity to rule on th[e] issue,” Response at 14 (quoting Brookside Mobile 
Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ¶14, 48 P.3d 968); specifically, that Mr. Elton’s 
statement of the issue was (1) untimely, (2) not specifically raised, and (3) presented no 
supporting evidence or authority, id. Pacific, however, is again mistaken. 
A.  Grantsville Raised the Issue at the Summary Judgment Hearing. 
 
 To begin with, the colloquy Pacific cites is not the sole mention of Pacific’s 
improper assertion of previously unraised issues: 
 MR. ELTON: [T]he disputed issues in this case should be resolved by 
the Court in reviewing the record and the proceedings before the city 
council. Section 10-9[a]-801(8) of the Utah Code states that the district 
court’s review is limited to the record provided by … the appeal authority 
which is the Grantsville City council in this matter, and the court may not 
accept or consider any evidence outside of the record …. We are, therefore, 
objecting to the extraneous information and materials … provided by 




 [P]robably those affidavits include their argument. They’ve got 
arguments about covenants, conditions and restrictions being amended…. 
 
[R. at 301: 3:10–4:16.] Mr. Marshall, Pacific’s counsel, recognized Mr. Elton’s argument 
as to improper review of matters outside the district-court record, and almost the first 
issue Mr. Marshall raised when his turn came was the matter of Pacific’s raising the 
additional claims outside the record. [R. at 301: 33:24–35:9.]  
In addition to these transcript passages, Grantsville made similar points as the 
hearing progressed: 
 MR. ELTON: Okay. This is an appeal on the record. But if [Pacific] 
had those claims, those issues [that is, the new declaratory-judgment, PUD-
expiration, and BFP claims], they should have presented [them] to the city 
council and said, “We didn’t know any of this….”  
 Since we don’t have that, I mean, we don’t, here we are on appeal and 
they’ve made these assertions of what (inaudible) they did or didn’t do and 
we can’t respond to that because there is not record with respect to that…. 
 THE COURT: So you’re [sic] argument would be then at the time of 
the actual appellate hearing in front of the city council this argument of 
notice was never raised? 
 ….  
 MR. ELTON: That’s correct. Never heard it. 
 
[R. at 301, 88:9–89:9.] The district court recognized and openly inquired about 
Grantsville’s on-the-record argument. In addition to raising the record-only review 
requirement of UCA § 10-9a-801, Grantsville distinguished the Pacific’s cases cited to 
justify its submission of the affidavits supporting its nonrecord claims. Grantsville clearly 
raised these issues several times before the district court.  [R. at 301, 96:3–9.] 
B. Grantsville Raised the Issue in its Summary Judgment Memoranda. 
 
By asserting that Grantsville addressed the improprieties of Pacific’s nonrecord 
arguments and extraneous evidence only once, and only during oral argument of the 
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summary judgment motions, Pacific implies that Grantsville didn’t raise the issues in its 
summary judgment memoranda. This is equally untrue.  
Grantsville’s opening Memorandum for Summary Judgment states quite clearly 
that “in evaluating the city’s decision under [the substantial evidence] standard, the court 
should only review the evidence in the record ….” [R. at 34 (citations omitted, emphasis 
added).] In addition, in its Memorandum in Opposition and Reply, Grantsville expressly 
cites to UCA § 10-9a-801(7)&(8), and pointedly explains that “the Court may not accept 
or consider any evidence outside the record of the … appeal authority, unless evidence 
was improperly excluded or unless there is no record to review” [R. at 208]. Thereafter, 
Grantsville discusses Pacific’s ill-placed faith in the Xanthos and Denver & Rio Grande 
cases. [R. at 207–08.] Grantsville concludes by noting that “[t]he cases cited by Pacific[ ] 
should only apply to the current matter if there was no record to consider on appeal” and 
that “the Affidavits of Caleb Roope, Douglas Gibson and Dennis Vanderheiden should 
be excluded from these proceedings and Pacific’s asserted facts and arguments based 
upon these Affidavits should also not be considered by the Court.” [R. at 207 (emphasis 
added).] Pacific’s argument ignores Grantsville’s many recorded objections to nonrecord 
evidence and claims, which demonstrate that the arguments were properly raised before 
the district court. 
C. Pacific Argued the Supposed Inapplicability §-801’s Record-Only 
Review Mandate to the District Court. 
 
Most tellingly, Pacific’s argument that Grantsville failed properly to raise the § 
10-9a-801 jurisdictional issues below is belied by Pacific’s protestations against the very 
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on-the-record restrictions it now claims never arose before the district court.  [R. at 151 
(where Pacific argues that the district court should be allowed to consider non-record 
affidavits).] Moreover, Pacific asserted in open court that its affidavits could be 
considered by the district court because under some circumstances “the Court has an 
opportunity to go beyond the boundaries of that record.” [R. at 301, 33:22–34:8]. 
 Having thus argued, at length, the admissibility issues in regard to the three 
affidavits and the additional claims based upon them, Pacific cannot with any consistency 
argue that Grantsville did not raise the issue timely, specifically, or with proper support. 
V. THE PARTICULARS OF PACIFIC’S “INDEPENDENT” CLAIMS. 
 
Part II of Pacific’s Response brings us back to the specifics of Pacific’s additional, 
“independent” claims: declaratory judgments as to (a) its being a bona-fide purchaser, 
and (b) the extinguishment of the PUD. Grantsville has already highlighted its concerns 
regarding the impropriety of these claims, but addresses Pacific’s arguments on these 
points (Response at 26–38) should the Court determine them relevant and admissible. 
A. Pacific’s “Additional Material Facts” are Both Irrelevant and 
Improper. 
 
Pacific first asserts that its “Additional Material Facts” must be deemed admitted 
for purposes of its summary judgment motion because Grantsville did not appropriately 
respond to them.4 Response at 26. These additional material facts rely heavily upon the 
                                                 
4 Among the most peculiar characteristics of judicial review of land-use issues pursuant 
to LUDMA is the employment of summary judgment as the mechanism to challenge 
administrative decisions before the district courts. The “arbitrary, capricious, or illegal” 
standard that governs the judicial review of land-use decisions, requires a determination 
that a challenged land use decision is either “reasonably debatable,” (for legislative 
actions) UCA § 10-9a-801(3)(b), or “supported by substantial evidence in the record,” 
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affidavits of Roope, Gibson, and Vanderheiden, [R. at 153-171], which were challenged 
before the district court by Grantsville both in its briefing and at oral argument, [R. at 
220; 301 at 3:10-23]. Grantsville also identified the relevant disputed material facts in its 
response with citations to the record. [R. at 217-25.] While Grantsville did not restate 
Pacific’s facts verbatim, Grantsville did identify the specific facts it was disputing and 
provided “applicable record references” in its response to Pacific’s motion. Bluffdale City 
v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, ¶10, 156 P.3d 175. Given that this case is an appeal of a land 
use decision and given the impropriety of the inclusion of Pacific’s additional claims and 
the submission of additional evidence to the district court, via extra-record affidavits, 
Grantsville’s failure if any to comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B) should be deemed harmless.5 
See Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, ¶23 n.4, 89 P.3d 155. 
B. The PUD has not Terminated. 
 
The district court incorrectly held that the PUD approved by the City Council for 
the Country Haven Condominiums PUD had terminated. Pacific insisted to the Planning 
Commission and the City Council that its application was nothing more than a minor 
adjustment to an existing PUD. [R. at 44: Exh. 5 at 3 and Exh. 9 at 4.] Pacific did not 
assert to the City Council that the PUD had expired. Whether the approval for Country 
                                                                                                                                                             
(for LUA or AppA decisions) id. at §-801(3)(c). Both of these standards are fact-
intensive and should therefore preclude summary judgment entirely. 
5 In any event, the district court never indicated whether it was deeming Pacific’s 
“Additional Material Facts” admitted. Rather, there is contrary evidence that the district 
court improperly (for a summary judgment motion) weighed the evidence presented, 
since the district court “found” that Pacific was a bona fide purchaser given its “belief” of 
the evidence, found “in fact” that the PUD had expired, and expressed its belief that the 
CC&Rs did not apply. [R. at 301, 119:7 to 120:17.] However, the district court is not 
permitted to weigh evidence on summary judgment. See Young v. Fire Ins. Exch., 2008 
UT App 114, ¶31, 182 P.3d 911 (further citation omitted).  
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Haven Condominiums PUD had terminated was an issue for the City Council, who had 
granted original approval of the PUD, to decide. However, Pacific did not give the City 
Council an opportunity to make this decision. Nevertheless, the City Council implicitly 
recognized that the PUD had not terminated when it overturned the Planning 
Commission’s approval and denied Pacific’s application. [R. at 44: Exh. 2 at 6-8.] 
Under the GCC, a PUD “permit” is valid in perpetuity, so long as “a building 
permit has been issued, construction has actually begun, within [a one-year] period, and 
construction has been diligently pursued.” GCC § 12.4(5). As Grantsville has already 
asserted, permits, however, were issued for Phase I, unquestionably part of the PUD, and 
construction did begin thereon within the one-year limit, and it was diligently pursued to 
completion. [R. at 203-04.] In fact, the residents of Phase One were those in attendance at 
both the Planning Commission and City Council meetings arguing against Pacific’s 
proposed amendments.  Given these undisputed facts, the district court improperly 
granted summary judgment to Pacific on this issue. 
Moreover, Pacific can hardly denounce the PUD as void after having brought 
applications before the City in 2005 and in 2007, seeking to complete the project in 
“substantial conformity” with the initial PUD. [R. at 224.] Its own actions demonstrate 
attempts to diligently pursue completion of the Country Haven Condominiums PUD by 
following the amendment procedure in GCC § 12.4. Pacific argues that this is an estoppel 
argument that should have been raised by Grantsville as an affirmative defense. Once 
again, Pacific’s argument fails to recognize that, in reality, the problem is not 
Grantsville’s delay in bringing this argument, but in Pacific’s failure to bring up this issue 
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before the City Council, where the matter should have been first addressed. 
C. Pacific’s “Future Phases” and “Statute of Frauds” Arguments Fatally 
Confuse Contract with Law. 
 
1. The question of the applicability of the CC&Rs is irrelevant. 
The district court ruled that “the PUD does not apply to the property described as 
the “future phases” portion of the Final Plat since the covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions (“CC&Rs”) for the Country Haven Condominiums were amended.”6 [R. at 
272-73.] While the district court’s ruling as written implicitly recognizes that the Country 
Haven Condominiums PUD has not in fact terminated, it is additionally important to note 
that the applicability of certain CC&Rs to a property has no bearing on the existence or 
effect of a PUD. The Country Haven Condominiums PUD was approved by Grantsville 
pursuant to its authority in GCC § 12.2 as a conditional use, and only the City Council 
can approve any zoning changes. See UCA § 10-9a-503.  CC&Rs are private, contractual, 
and independent of land use approvals, having no bearing or effect upon the PUD.  In 
other words, it matters not what the CC&Rs say or even if there are CC&Rs at all as far 
as the Planning Commission and City Council are concerned. 
Grantsville’s arguments on this issue were preserved. All of Pacific’s evidence 
regarding the CC&Rs is based purely on the affidavits of Roope, Gibson, and 
Vanderheiden. Grantsville challenged the admissibility of these affidavits both in its 
                                                 
6 It would seem in any event, that the district court’s ruling on this matter has little or no 
effect upon Grantville since Grantsville was not a party to the CC&Rs, and Pacific failed 
to name the proper parties, i.e., the other property owners, that should have been a part of 
its declaratory judgment action on this issue. See UCA § 78B-6-403(1). 
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written memoranda and in its arguments before the district court.7 In any event, any 
amendment to the CC&Rs would have no binding effect on the PUD process established 
and governed by Grantsville City ordinances. See GCC 12.4 Therefore the district court 
erroneously and improperly granted Pacific summary judgment on this issue. 
2. The Statute of Frauds does not apply to what Pacific labels the 
“unrecorded restrictions.” 
 
The district court also erred in ruling that the “Statute of Frauds” applied to bar 
any PUD restrictions adopted by the City Council for the Country Haven Condominiums 
project.8 In response to Grantsville’s pointing out that Pacific’s Statute-of-Frauds 
argument relied upon case law without precedential value (Forest Meadow Ranch 
Property Owners Ass’n v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass’n, 2005 UT App 294, 118 P.3d 
871; Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass’n, 2007 UT 2, 151 P.3d 962), Pacific seeks 
to redeem its argument by minimizing the Utah Supreme Court’s holding. Response at 32 
(citing Peters, 2007 UT 2 at ¶23). In point of fact, however, the Peters Court “affirm[ed] 
the result reached by the court of appeals in both Forest Meadow and Peters, limit[ed] 
the Court of Appeals’ decisions to the facts of each case, and deem[ed] the decisions to 
                                                 
7 The CC&Rs and any amendments thereto are not attached to any of the affidavits or 
found anywhere else in the record. According to Rule 56, affidavits must “set forth facts 
as would be admissible in evidence” and that “copies of all papers . . . referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto.” Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(e). While Pacific alleges failure 
to comply with the rules, its own actions demonstrate the same weakness. 
 
8 The district court’s decision rests on the existence of certain “Unrecorded Restrictions.” 
[R. at 272.] The City Council’s decision directed Pacific to either “seek approval of Phase 
Two of the Orchard lane [sic] Condominium project as was originally approved in the 
development plan, or to seek approval of an amended development plan in conformity 
with the procedures set forth in Section 12.4 and Section 7.8 of [GCC].” [R. at 44: Exh. 2 
at 7-8.] The decision does not forever bind Pacific to any “Unrecorded Restrictions.” 
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be without precedential effect.” Peters, 2007 UT 2, ¶23 (emphasis added). 
Oddly, having rhetorically picked up Grantsville’s gauntlet on this issue, Pacific 
fails to so much as draw its sword in the actual battle: Despite its forcibly asserting that 
that “[t]he statute of fraud analysis of this Court in Forest Meadow is sound and 
supported by other authorities” (Response at 32), Pacific fails to name any of them. But 
Forest Meadow is inapposite regardless, as it dealt with a dispute over CC&Rs, purely 
private contractual creatures, rather than PUDs, which are creatures of law, and the issues 
addressed arose between two private entities; no governmental entities were involved. 
This is probably just as well, however, since the claim Pacific cites Forest 
Meadow and Peters to establish—that design restrictions appearing on the approved 1997 
project plan are unenforceable because the City Council did not sign them—runs contrary 
to statutory precept as well as common sense. Utah’s statute of frauds specifically 
provides two methods by which “estate[s] or interest[s] in real property” may be “created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared”: First, “by act or operation of law, or[, 
Second,] by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the [conveying] party ….” 
UCA § 25-5-1. LUDMA authorizes municipalities to “enact all ordinances, resolutions, 
and rules and . . . enter into other forms of land use controls and development agreements 
. . . that they consider necessary or appropriate for the use and development of land 
within the municipality.” UCA § 10-9a-102(2). Zoning restrictions, such as PUD 
constraints, constitute “act[s] or operation[s] of law” rather than by “conveyance in 
writing subscribed” by the lawmaker.  
Because the City Council’s adoption of the Country Haven Condominiums PUD 
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was not a violation of the statute of frauds, the district court erred in granting declaratory 
judgment for Pacific by applying the statute of frauds to declare the PUD ineffective. 
D. Pacific Cannot Plausibly be Considered a Bona Fide Purchaser. 
 
Finally, the district court erred in holding that Pacific is a bona fide purchaser 
regarding the “Unrecorded Restrictions.” [R. at 272.] Pacific’s bona-fide-purchaser 
argument rests on its claims that it took possession of the “future phases” portion of the 
Country Haven Condominiums PUD without notice of the approved PUD restrictions. 
Pacific relies on the improperly submitted affidavits of Roope, Gibson, and Vanderheiden 
as support. Nevertheless, the facts and the law do not support Pacific’s position. 
It must first be observed that the argument that land use restrictions are barred by 
the statute of frauds if not recorded is a novelty.  No Utah Court has ever so held.9  
However, even if we indulge Pacific’s argument that land use restrictions must be of 
record, it still fails.  To be a good faith, bona fide purchaser, a party must have no notice 
of the “infirmity of his grantor’s title.” Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 
2004 UT 23, ¶13, 89 P.3d 155. Notice to a party may be actual or constructive notice, 
including record notice and inquiry notice. See id. Pacific had ample notice of the 
approved engineering drawings [R. at 44: Exh. 22] and admits to having notice of final 
plat. Response at 35. The recorded Final Plat showing future phases [R. at 44: Exh. 23], 
the Planning Commission and City Council approvals and existing land-use ordinances, 
which Pacific admits to reviewing, provided constructive notice to Pacific as 
                                                 
9 In Pacific’s world, entire zoning codes and all restrictions to the use of land based on 
such codes would need to be recorded in the Office of the County Recorder or a 
purchaser would be free of zoning-based restrictions as a “bona fide purchaser without 
notice.”  The absurdity of this argument is self-evident. 
4812-7825-9459.GR058.001 21
contemplated by Metro West Ready Mix, putting Pacific on notice that the property was a 
part of a 80-unit Planned Unit Development, and that a detailed plan approved by the 
City for the development of the balance of the property existed.  
At the very least, Pacific was aware of all of the documents—the engineering 
drawings, the Final Plat, and the minutes from the City Council’s original approval—
prior to making its application to develop the “future phases” of the PUD. [R. at 167-69.] 
The administrative record is replete with evidence directly contesting Pacific’s bona-fide-
purchaser claim, creating numerous issues of material fact. [See, e.g., R. at 44: Exh. 5 at 
4.] Thus, the district court improperly granted summary judgment, and this Court should 
reverse the district court’s ruling on Pacific’s bona-fide-purchaser claim. 
GRANTSVILLE’S RESPONSE TO PACIFIC’S CROSS-APPEAL 
 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL 
ISSUE NO. 6: Whether substantial evidence in the record supports the City 
Council’s decision to deny Pacific’s application for final plat approval. (Preserved: R. at 
44, Exh. 2 at 6-8).10 
Standard of Review: A court considering a land use decision shall “presume that 
a decision . . . made under the authority of [LUDMA] is valid.” UCA § 10-9a-
801(3)(a)(i). Further, “[a] final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is 
valid if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal.” Id. at § 10-9a-801(3)(c). When this Court reviews a district court’s 
                                                 
10 Ironically, Pacific fails to provide a citation to the record demonstrating that its lone 
issue on cross-appeal had been preserved below as required by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(5)(A). 
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review of a land use decision, it proceeds as if it is reviewing the municipality’s land use 
decision directly, and does not defer or accord a presumption of correctness to the district 
court’s judgment. See Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 85, ¶11, __ P.3d __; Carrier v. Salt 
Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ¶17, 104 P.3d 1208; Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of 
Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Finally, this Court’s review, just 
like the review of the district court, is to be done solely on the record generated before the 
land use authority at the city level, and the Court should not accept or consider any 
evidence outside the record. See UCA § 10-9a-801(8)(a); Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS11 
 
Grantsville identified the determinative provisions in its Opening Brief. 
VI. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
In its cross-appeal, Pacific challenges the district court’s decision to grant 
summary judgment to Grantsville, affirming the City Council’s decision to deny Pacific’s 
application for final plat approval. [R. at 272-74.] This appeal is governed by Section 10-
9a-801, which states that a court considering a land use decision shall “presume that a 
decision . . . made under the authority of [LUDMA] is valid.” UCA § 10-9a-801(3)(a)(i). 
The court then considers only “whether or not the decision . . . is arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal.” Id. at § 10-9a-801(3)(a)(ii). LUDMA specifies that “[a] final decision of a land 
use authority or an appeal authority is valid if it is supported by substantial evidence in 
the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.” Id. at § 10-9a-801(3)(c).  
The review conducted by this Court does not question the validity of the district 
                                                 
11 The relevant determinative statutes from the Opening Brief are set forth in full in the 
Addendum at Tab A. 
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court’s decision, but rather focuses on the validity of the City Council’s decision to 
overturn the Planning Commission and deny Pacific’s petition. See Fox, 2008 UT 85 at 
¶11; Carrier, 2004 UT 98 at ¶17; Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603. “A municipality’s land use 
decisions are entitled to a great deal of deference.” Springville Citizens for a Better 
Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶23, 979 P.2d 332. To determine whether 
a municipality’s land use decision is arbitrary or capricious, Utah appellate courts 
“review the evidence in the record to ensure that the City proceeded within the limits of 
fairness and acted in good faith.” Id. at ¶24; see also Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604. While 
the appellate court is to determine “whether, in light of the evidence before the City, a 
reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as the City,” the reviewing court does 
not “weigh the evidence anew or substitute [its] judgment for that of the municipality.” 
Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25 at ¶23. “It does not lie within the prerogative of [a 
reviewing court] to substitute its judgment for that of the Board where the record 
discloses a reasonable basis for the Board’s decision.” Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment of 
Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1984). 
VII. CITY COUNCIL PROPERLY DETERMINED TO DENY PACIFIC’S APPLICATION. 
Acting as an appellate authority, the City Council followed the proper procedure, 
heard evidence, and made an appropriate decision. On February 21, 2007, the City 
Council considered two appeals of the Planning Commission’s approval of Pacific’s final 
plat for Phase Two of the Country Haven Condominiums. [R. at 44: Exh. 5 at 2.] At the 
meeting, the City Council heard presentations by Pacific and by the citizen parties 
challenging Pacific’s application. [R. at 44: Exh. 5 at 2-10.] In addition, Pacific was 
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granted opportunities to answer questions raised by the City Council. [R. at 44: Exh. 5 at 
10-11.] After conducting further discussion, Todd Castagno, a councilmember, moved to 
deny Pacific’s application based on the fact that the adjustments proposed to Pacific’s 
Phase Two “do not meet the minor adjustments listed in Section 12.5” of the GCC. [R. at 
44: Exh. 5 at 13.] Mr. Castagno also noted that Pacific’s application was not “in 
substantial conformity” with the original PUD [R. at 44: Exh. 5 at 14.] All members of 
the City Council voted to deny Pacific’s application,12 [R. at 44: Exh. 5 at 14], and 
directed city staff to bring back a written report with specific findings based upon its 
decision for the City Council’s approval. [Id.]  
On March 7, 2007, the City Council approved the Findings and Decisions 
prepared by the city staff. [R. at 44: Exh. 3.] Because Pacific’s proposal constituted more 
than a minor adjustment, and instead was a major adjustment, requiring a significant 
modification of the previously approved plan, the City Council denied Pacific’s request 
for final plat and plan approval for Phase Two of the Orchard Lane Condominiums 
project. [R. at 44: Exh. 2 at 9-10.] The City Council directed Pacific to either submit 
plans for approval that substantially conformed with the original development plan for 
the Orchard Land Condominium PUD or to seek approval of an amended development 
plan in conformance with the procedures set forth in the GCC. [R. at 44: Exh. 2 at 10-11.] 
                                                 
12 In making its decision, the City Council “reviewed the most recent decision of the 
Planning Commission, the original approvals for the Country Haven Condominium 
Planned Unit Development, including the future phase(s), all of the minutes of the 
Planning Commission and City Council approving the original plats and the development 
plan for the proposed future phase(s), the current application for approval of Phase Two, 
the comments made at the public hearing of the City Council and the appeals filed by the 
two interested groups.” [R. at 44: Exh. 2 at 1-2.] 
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The City Council’s decision was supported by both law and fact. 
VIII. THE GCC ALLOWS ADJUSTMENTS IN ONLY LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES. 
 
A. Major Adjustments are Not Allowed Unless they Substantially 
Conform to the Original Plan. 
 
The City Council relied on GCC § 12.5 to deny Pacific’s application. Chapter 12 
of the GCC governs PUDs, and Section 12.5 addresses amendments to previously 
approved development plans. Pursuant to this section, “the Planning Commission may 
authorize minor adjustments” to an approved development plan “when such adjustments 
appear necessary in light of technical or engineering considerations.” GCC § 12.5(1). 
Such considerations include adjustment of distances between structures, adjusting the 
location of open space, adjusting final grades, or altering landscaping elements. See id.  
Under the GCC the Planning Commission may approve major adjustments to a 
development plan in limited circumstances. After giving notice to adjoining property 
owners, “[t]he Planning Commission . . . may approve an application for a major 
adjustment of the Final Development Plan . . . upon finding that any changes in the plan 
as approved will be in substantial conformity to the final Development Plan.” GCC § 
12.5(3). The City Council compared the evidence before it to the standards established in 
the GCC, properly concluded it was a major adjustment, and denied Pacific’s application. 
1. Pacific’s application was not in substantial conformity. 
 
Pacific challenges the determination of the City Council, asserting that the City 
Council did not rely upon substantial evidence to support its decision. See Response at 
42. In support of its argument, Pacific provides the Court only with selected supporting 
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facts, improperly rebutting “those facts with evidence not in the record.” Patterson v. 
Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 605 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Contrary to 
Pacific’s claims, substantial evidence in the record supports the City Council’s decision. 
The record shows that Garry Bolinder, the original developer of the Country 
Haven Condominiums PUD sought and obtained approval to rezone the property, 
including the future phases later purchased by Pacific, from R-1-8 to an RM-15 zone in 
order to develop a condominium project with “81 units in a total of 29 buildings.” [R. at 
44: Exh. 17 and Exh. 19 at 1-2.] Garry Bolinder brought back a modified concept plan for 
the condominium project to the Planning Commission on August 17, 1997, for an 80 unit 
complex. [R. at 44: Exh. 16 at p 1.] The plan included units with between 2200 to 3500 
square feet. [Id.] Each building would have two or three units. [Id.] Each unit had “a two 
car garage and a 20 foot driveway where friends could park.” [Id.] The concept plan was 
not limited to any particular phase, but governed the entire project, and was approved by 
the Planning Commission subject to the completion of a traffic study. [Id. at 2]  
On October 9, 1997, after receiving the results of the traffic study, the Planning 
Commission approved a narrowing of the first 100 feet of the road into the project with 
“no parking” signs placed in certain locations and a six foot fence placed around the 
entire project. [R. at 44: Exh. 14 at 1-2.] The Planning Commission requested that Garry 
Bolinder resubmit a corrected set of drawings, showing the cross-section for the roadway 
and the drainage system. [Id.] Exhibit 22 contains a set of drawings, dated November 20, 
1997, describing a grading plan, a utility plan, plans and profiles for all of the cul-de-
sac’s in the project, storm drain details, and street utility improvements for the Country 
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Haven Condominium project. Admittedly, the drawings specify the Country Haven 
Condominiums – Phase One, but none of the drawings are expressly limited only to the 
first phase of the project, but rather encompass the entire project as a whole.  
At the Planning Commission’s December 11, 1997 meeting, it was explained to 
Garry Bolinder that before approval could be obtained from the City Council, the City 
would have to review any covenants that would affect the project. [R. at 44: Exh. 13 at 
2.] Additional height restrictions were placed on two of the buildings in the project. [Id.] 
With these and certain other conditions, the Planning Commission approved the final plat 
for Country Haven Condominiums project with certain restrictions. [R. at 44: Exh. 13 at 
2.] The City Council gave its approval for the final plat “for Country Haven Condos” on 
December 17, 1997. [R. at 44: Exh. 12.] The City Council approved phasing of the 
development, conditioned upon “approval of the city engineer and City council for each 
phase.” [Id.] The minutes note a concern about the roads, traffic, and height of the 
buildings. [Id.] These concerns and the approval of for the condominium project, with an 
allowance for the development to be constructed in phases, could not have occurred 
without reference to the drawings for the entire project prepared by the developer. [R. at 
44: Exh. 22 and Exh. 23.] Indeed, the GCC requires that approval of a final plat include 
approval of the final development plan. See GCC § 12.4(4).  
The final plat for Phase One of the project was recorded on May 5, 1998. [R. at 
44: Exh. 23.] It shows the dimensions and location of the roadway, cul-de-sacs and storm 
drain retention area for the entire project. [Id.] It identifies the location of fee simple 
areas, limited common areas, common areas and maintenance access throughout the 
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entire project, and it states that “Country Haven Condominiums is subject to the 
declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions and reservations of easements 
recorded with this plat.” [Id.] It contains an overall boundary description for the entire 
project, including the future phases purchased by Pacific, and a dedication of a non-
exclusive easement to Grantsville “over the utility easements shown on the plat.” [Id.] 
The final plat also identifies the location and size of all of the buildings in the “future 
phases” and identifies unit types by letter designations “A,” “C,” “D,” “F,” and “G.” [Id.] 
On August 11, 2005, the Planning Commission considered Pacific’s first 
application to amend the PUD. [R. at 44: Exh. 11.] Pacific characterized its application as 
a “minor modification” to the Country Haven Condominiums PUD. [Id. at 4.] Mike 
Warner, a member of the Planning Commission in 1997 and in 2005, stated that the City 
made a deal with the developer back in 1997, allowing for an 80-units project with two to 
three units per building. [Id. at 6.] The units were to be individually owned with two car 
garages, constructed with brick, stone, or stucco exteriors with a 35 foot maximum height 
and privacy fencing. [Id.] In 2005, the Planning Commission denied Pacific’s application 
to amend because “it does not meet with the intent of the original P.U.D. approval.” [Id.] 
All of these record facts identified the items associated with the original plan for the 
Country Haven Condominiums PUD. 
2. Pacific’s Application Fails the Minor Adjustment Test. 
Comparing Pacific’s proposed drawings for Phase Two of the Country Haven 
Condominium project [R. at 44: Exh. 21] to these facts, the City Council properly 
determined to deny Pacific’s application. [R. at 44: Exh. 2 at 6-9.] The City Council 
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determined that Pacific’s proposal would involve the construction of 22 buildings placed 
in different locations and using different building types. [R. at 44: Exh. 2 at 6.] The City 
Council also determined that Pacific’s proposal reconfigures the street layout and 
drainage plan. [Id.] The City Council also determined that Pacific’s application included 
smaller residential units with single car garages and no basements. [R. at 44: Exh. 2 at 6.]  
Comparing the original plan for the Country Haven Condominiums project with 
Pacific’s application for final plat approval of Phase Two, it cannot be disputed that 
Pacific’s proposal not only adjusts the distance between structures and adjusts the 
location of open space, but it also realigns the roadway and modifies retention pond 
locations and more. A simple comparison of the final plat and Pacific’s proposal makes 
these facts clear. Compare R. at 44: Exh. 23 (attached hereto in the Addendum at Tab G) 
to R. at 44: Exh. 21 at map GP-1 (attached hereto in the Addendum at Tab H). The 
evidence in the record demonstrates that the original plan included larger units with two-
car garages and establishes other elements of the development plan. [R. at 44: Exh. 11 at 
6 and Exh. 16 at 1.] Since the proposal contained more than minor adjustments, the 
question for the City Council then became whether Pacific’s application, in reality an 
application for a major adjustment, substantially conformed to the original plan. See GCC 
§ 12.5(3). Given the substantial evidence in the record identified above, the City Council 
appropriately denied Pacific’s application as a major adjustment that did not meet the 
standard of substantial conformity. 
B. This Court Cannot Re-Weigh the Evidence in the Record. 
Although this Court is prohibited from weighing the evidence and substituting its 
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judgment for that of the City Council, see Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. 
City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶24, 979 P.2d 332, Pacific is nevertheless requesting that 
this Court make such determinations. However, the City Council’s decision should be 
upheld if the record demonstrates that “the City proceeded within the limits of fairness 
and acted in good faith.” Id.  
For example, Pacific asserts that none of the record evidence outside of the 
recorded final plat can be considered to identify the final development plan for the 
Country Haven Condominium project. Response at 44. However, the GCC states that 
“[t]he Final Plat together with the final development plan and special conditions for the 
planned unit development … shall constitute the use, parking, loading, sign, bulk, space 
and yard regulations applicable to the subject property.” GCC § 12.4(4) (emphasis 
added). It also requires that the final plat “include a notation of any changes, alterations, 
modifications or waivers of the regular standards of the zoning district and shall list any 
special conditions.” Id. (emphasis added). However, the GCC does not require that the 
final development plan be recorded or even referred to on the Final Plat.  
The original developer submitted and received final approval for a concept plan 
for the entire property on August 14, 1997. [R. at 44: Exh. 16 at 2.] The Planning 
Commission on October 9, 1997, requested a corrected set of drawings be submitted by 
the developer. [R. at 44: Exh. 14 at 2.] A set of drawings dated November 20, 1997, for 
all of the Country Haven Condominiums PUD was available to the Planning Commission 
before its final approval of the final plat on December 11, 1997 [R. at 44: Exh. 23], and 
were used as a basis for the City Council’s approval of the Country Haven 
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Condominiums on December 17, 1997 [R. at 44: Exh. 5 at 12]. These drawings were 
before the City Council when it made its decision to deny Pacific’s application on 
February 21, 2007. [R. at 44: Exh. 2 at 1.] 
Pacific argues that the information regarding the plan for the Country Haven 
Condominium PUD was not all located on or referenced in the final plat recorded for 
Phase One, so its project should not be held to the standards highlighted in the previous 
approvals for the PUD. Indeed, Pacific did not approach its application to the Planning 
Commission or the City Council as if no development plan existed. In its presentation 
before the City Council, Pacific couched its application as appropriate under both 
standards enunciated in the GCC for minor and major adjustments to existing PUDs. [R. 
at 44: Exh. 5 at 3.] Pacific also admitted that it was aware of all of the information 
contained in the minutes that constitute a part of the administrative record. [Id. at 4.] 
Despite this admission to knowledge of the information in the record and the standards 
within the GCC, Pacific wants to escape from the consequences of the application of that 
information and those GCC standards.  
IX. PACIFIC FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE CITY COUNCIL’S DECISION IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
 
Grantsville agrees with Pacific that all of the record evidence Pacific identifies in 
Part III.B. of Pacific’s Response support’s the City Council’s decision to deny Pacific’s 
request. See Response at 39-41. Additionally, the evidence in the record listed above 
supports the City Council’s decision. See supra Part VIII.A. This Court has held that a 
party has not properly marshaled evidence, to the extent marshalling is required, by 
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“merely supplying the court with selected supporting facts and attempting to rebut those 
facts with evidence not in the record nor before the Board.” Patterson, 893 P.2d at 605 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). In its brief, Pacific has provided the Court with only selected 
supporting facts from the record before the City Council and makes continual attempts to 
rebut the facts with evidence not in the record before the City Council. 
This Court’s review, like the district court’s review, is made solely on the record 
generated before the City Council, and the Court should not accept or consider any 
evidence outside the record. See UCA § 10-9a-801(8)(a); Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604. In 
this case Grantsville maintained a record and submitted  it to the district court. [R. at 44.] 
Non-record evidence may be considered only if “that evidence was offered to the land 
use authority or appeal authority…and the court determines that it was improperly 
excluded.” Id. at § 10-9a-801(8)(a)(ii). Therefore, the district court was prohibited from 
accepting or considering evidence outside of the record. See id. at § 10-9a-801(a)(i).  
Nevertheless, Pacific’s arguments rely heavily upon the non-record affidavits of 
Douglas Gibson, Dennis Vanderheiden, and Caleb Roope. See Response at 44-45, 48-50. 
None of these affidavits were presented to the City Council, but were first presented to 
the district court in support of Pacific’s cross-motion for summary judgment. [R. at 79-
102.] Pacific cannot show, and has made no effort in its brief to argue, that these 
affidavits were made available to the City Council and improperly rejected as is required 
to justify this Court’s consideration of that evidence. See UCA § 10-9a-801(8)(a)(ii). 
Since the affidavits were not a part of the record before the City Council, this Court 
cannot consider any evidence presented in them. 
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X. THE CITY COUNCIL DID NOT VIOLATE PACIFIC’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
In an effort to validate and legitimize its non-record affidavits, Pacific argues that 
its due process rights were violated by claiming the City Council relied upon a sales 
brochure submitted after the hearing, relying on land use decisions “viewed in the light of 
accepted due process requirements” found in Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake 
City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984) (further citation omitted). If due process has not 
been met, Pacific asserts that a Court may consider evidence outside the record. Response 
at 38. Pacific’s argument on this issue, however, must fail both legally and factually.  
A. Xanthos Allows Evidence Only If There is No Record. 
First, in Xanthos, the Utah Supreme Court noted that there was no record of the 
proceedings before the board of adjustment. See id. at 1034. The Court noted that under 
due process requirements, when a review must be considered on the record but there is no 
record, “the reviewing court must be allowed to get at the facts.” Id. Since there was no 
record, the district court properly took “its own evidence.” Id. However, the Court 
cautioned that “[t]his does not mean that the hearing in the district court should be a 
retrial on the merits, or that the district court can substitute its judgment for that of the 
Board.” Id. Thus, the due process requirements enunciated in Xanthos simply allowed a 
trial court to take evidence when no record existed from the prior proceedings. 
B. The Julie Black Letter Added Nothing New to the Record. 
Pacific goes on to argue that its due process rights were offended because findings 
in paragraph 3 of the City Council’s Findings and Decision were improperly based on 
evidence presented to the City Council in a letter from Julie Black dated March 6, 2007, 
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which was not part of the record. Response at 45. However, even if you extend the ruling 
in Xanthos as suggested by Pacific, the letter from Ms. Black added nothing new to the 
record.  The facts concerning the “residential unit types, designated A, C, D, F, and G” 
were readily available to the City Council in the record by reviewing the documents 
submitted by the original developer and the final plat, which contained the unit 
designations of A, C, D, F, and G. [R. at 44: Exh. 22 and Exh. 23.] The factual 
information regarding square footage and two-car garages was available to the City 
Council by reviewing the minutes from previous meetings. [R. at 44: Exh. 11 at 6 and 
Exh. 16 at 1.] Such information was also included in the appeals brought by the Country 
Haven Homeowners’ Association, Inc., and a separate group of concerned citizens. [R. at 
44: Exh. 7 at 1-2 and Exh. 8 at 4.]  
The Findings did attach a copy of the floor plans from Julie Black, but only for a 
limited purpose–to identify the specific floor plans by name. [R. at 44: Exh. 2 at 3.] The 
“evidence” in the Julie Black letter was duplicative of evidence already before the City 
Council when it made its decision. Because the evidence was already in the record, the 
City Council did not exceed the limits of fairness or fail to act in good faith. See 
Springville Citizens, at ¶24. Therefore, at most, the inclusion of the information from the 
Julie Black letter constituted harmless error. See, e.g., Cal Wadsworth Const. v. City of St. 
George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378-79 (Utah 1995) (“An error is harmful if it is reasonably 
likely that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.”). 
C. A Development Plan Governed the Country Haven Condominiums. 
In addition, Pacific challenges the City Council’s reliance on any sort of 
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development plan for the Country Haven Condominium project. Contrary to Pacific’s 
arguments, the record evidence demonstrates that the Planning Commission relied upon 
drawings for the project prepared by the developer. [R. at 44: Exh. 14 at 2.] The 
developer prepared and submitted concept plans for the project which were approved by 
the Planning Commission. [R. at 44: Exh. 16 at 2.] In addition, the GCC states that 
approval of a final plat includes approval of the final development plan. See GCC § 
12.4(4). The City Council, therefore, properly considered the developer’s November 20, 
1997 drawings as part of the development plan. [R. at 44: Exh. 22.] All of the minutes 
establish that the Country Haven Condominiums PUD was presented by the original 
developer as a whole project for approval. [R. at 44: Exh. 12.] The City Council’s 
reliance on evidence in the record establishing the existence of a development plan was 
neither misguided nor misplaced, but rested on substantial evidence.13 
D. Pacific Has Not Shown How It was Prejudiced. 
Even if, arguendo, this Court determines that the inclusion of the Julie Black letter 
or the consideration of the November 20, 1997 drawings as part of a development plan 
constituted a violation of due process, this Court should not overturn the City Council’s 
decision. A failure to comply with legal requirements “does not automatically entitle 
                                                 
13 Pacific further challenges the fact that the City Council directed its staff to prepare 
findings and conclusion after it had voted to deny Pacific’s application. Response at 43. 
The City Council made its decision based upon the evidence before it but directed city 
staff to prepare a written decision. [Id. at 13-14.] The City Council’s action was very 
similar to when a district court, after receiving evidence, hearing argument, and stating its 
decision on the record in open court, directs one of the parties to prepare a written ruling. 
This is even more appropriate in light of the part-time service of City Council members.  
In any event, the City Council met again and voted to approve the Findings and Decision 
on March 7, 2007. [R. at 44: Exh. 3.] 
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plaintiffs to the relief they request.” Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25 at ¶31. Instead, 
Pacific must “establish that [it] was prejudiced by the City’s noncompliance” 
demonstrating “how, if at all, the City’s decision would have been different and what 
relief, if any, [it] is entitled to as a result.” Id. Pacific has not met this burden, and cannot 
show how it was prejudiced by the City Council’s actions. The challenged evidence was 
duplicative of evidence found elsewhere in the record, and the record contains substantial 
evidence supporting the City Council’s decision to deny Pacific’s application. Therefore, 
this Court should deny Pacific’s cross-appeal and uphold the City Council’s decision. 
CONCLUSION TO REPLY BRIEF AND RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL 
Pacific improperly raised additional claims before the district court that were not 
raised before the City Council.  The district court should not have permitted these 
additional claims and the additional evidence submitted outside of the City Council’s 
record.  Even if they were properly before the district court, summary and declaratory 
judgment should not have been granted to Pacific on its additional claims because they 
were not supported by undisputed fact or law.  On the other hand, substantial evidence in 
the record supports the City Council’s decision to overturn the Planning Commission’s 
approval and deny Pacific’s application to modify the Country Haven Condominiums 
PUD.  The City Council’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Grantsville 
respectfully requests that this Court uphold the City Council’s decision to deny Pacific’s 
application and affirm district court’s denial of Pacific’s petition for review.  Grantsville 
further request that this Court overturn the district court’s decision to grant Pacific 
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Tab A Relevant Statutes and City Ordinances from the Opening Brief. 
Tab G  Final Plat for Country Haven Condominiums, Phase One (R. at 44: Exh. 23) 
Tab H. Pacific’s Proposal for Country Have Condominiums, Phase Two (R. at 44: 





UCA § 10-9a-801 
(1)  No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision made 
under this chapter, or under a regulation made under authority of this chapter, until 
that person has exhausted the person's administrative remedies as provided in Part 7, 
Appeal Authority and Variances, if applicable. 
(2)  (a)  Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or in 
violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the 
decision with the district court within 30 days after the local land use decision 
is final. 
* * * * 
(3)  (a)  The courts shall: 
(i)  presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the 
authority of this chapter is valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(b)  A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative 
discretion is valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinance, or 
regulation promotes the purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal. 
(c)  A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the 
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
(d)  A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, 
ordinance, or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the 
time the decision was made or the ordinance or regulation adopted. 
* * * * 
(6)  The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the appeal authority's 
decision is final. 
(7)  (a)  The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit 
to the reviewing court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, 
findings, orders, and, if available, a true and correct transcript of its 
proceedings. 
(b)  If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording is a true 
and correct transcript for purposes of this Subsection (7). 
(8) (a)  (i)  If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record 
provided by the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may 
be. 
(ii)  The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of 
the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that 
evidence was offered to the land use authority or appeal authority, 
respectively, and the court determines that it was improperly excluded. 
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(b)  If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence. 
* * * * 
 
 
Grantsville Land Use Management and Development Code 
§ 3.22 APPEALS. 
(1) The applicant or any other person or entity adversely affected by a decision 
administering or interpreting a land use ordinance may appeal that decision 
applying the land use ordinance by alleging that there is error in any order, 
requirement, decision, or determination made by an official in the administration, 
interpretation, or enforcement of the land use ordinance within 30 days of the 
decision. 
(2) Any officer, department, board, or bureau of Grantsville City affected by the grant, 
or refusal of a building permit or by any other decisions of the zoning administrator 
in the enforcement and administration of the land use ordinance may appeal any 
decision to the board of adjustment. The appellant has the burden of proving that the 
land use authority erred. 
(3) Only decisions applying the ordinance may be appealed to the board of adjustment. 
(4) A person may not appeal, and the Board of Adjustment may not consider, any land 
use ordinance amendments. 
(5) Appeals may not be used to waive or modify the terms or requirements of the land 
use ordinance. 
(6) In making an appeal, an adversely affected party shall present to the appeal 
authority every theory of relief that it can raise in district court.  
 
 
§ 12.4 Application Procedure. (Amended 98, 11/99) 
(1) Except as required by this section, the application and approval procedures for 
planned unit developments are the same as is specified in the Subdivision 
Regulations contained in Section 2 of Chapter 21 of this Code. Planned unit 
developments shall also comply with the other provisions of Chapter 21, where 
applicable, including design standards for subdivision. Applications for a planned 
unit development concept shall be filed with the City at least 21 days prior to the 
Planning Commission meeting where it will first be considered. 
(2) In addition to the application requirements for subdivisions, an applicant for a 
planned unit development shall submit the following information with the concept 
plan application: 
(a) At the concept phase, the applicant shall submit a written statement addressing 
each of the standards set forth in Section 7.8 herein entitled, Determination, 
when applicable and how the proposed development will promote the 
objectives set forth in Section 12.1 of this Chapter. The statement shall explain 
specifically how the proposed planned unit development relates to each such 
standard and promotes a listed objective; (Amended 11/99) 
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(b) At the preliminary phase, the applicant shall submit a written statement 
indicating specifically what change, alteration, modification or waiver of any 
zoning or development regulation is being sought by the developer, if any. 
(Amended 11/99) 
(3) The Chairman of the Planning Commission in consultation with the Zoning 
Administrator or the Planning Commission itself may set a public hearing regarding 
any proposed planned unit development, prior to considering an application or at 
any time prior to final approval of the development by the Planning Commission. If 
a public hearing is set on a proposed planned unit development, written notice to 
adjoining property owners shall be required in addition to the regular notice placed 
in the local newspaper. The chairman of the Planning Commission or the Planning 
Commission itself may specify that written notice be given to property owners 
beyond adjoining property owners. The applicant shall be responsible for all of the 
costs incurred by the City to provide written and published notice of any such 
public hearing.  
(4) The Final Plat approval shall include approval of the final development plan and all 
special conditions applicable to the planned unit development. The Final Plat 
together with the final development plan and special conditions for the planned unit 
development, rather than any other provision of this Ordinance, shall constitute the 
use, parking. loading, sign, bulk, space and yard regulations applicable to the 
subject property, and no use or development, other than a home occupation or 
temporary uses, not allowed by the Final Plat and development plan and conditions 
shall be permitted within the area of the planned unit development. The Final Plat 
shall include a notation of any changes, alterations, modifications or waivers of the 
regular standards of the zoning district and shall list any special conditions. 
(5) (Amended 98) Any party aggrieved by the final decision of the Planning 
Commission, with respect to a Concept Phase, Preliminary Phase or Final Plat and 
Development Plan regarding a planned unit development, may appeal such decision 
to the City Council, whose decision shall then be final. All appeals to the City 
Council must be in writing and filed with the Zoning Administrator within thirty 
(30) days of the date of the decision appealed from and prior to any further 
consideration by the Planning Commission of a subsequent step in the planned unit 
development approval process. Only the final decision of the City Council with 
respect to the Final Plat and Development Plan may be appealed to the District 
Court, provided such appeal is filed within thirty (30) days of the decision of the 
City Council. Said appeal shall be filed with the City Recorder and with the Clerk 
of the District Court. No planned unit development permit shall be valid for a period 
longer than one year unless a building permit has been issued, construction has 
actually begun within that period and construction has been diligently pursued. 
Upon written request of the applicant, the one year period may be extended by the 
Planning Commission for such time as it shall determine for good cause shown, 




§ 12.5 Adjustments to Development Plan. 
(1) No alteration or amendment shall be made in the construction, development or use 
without a new application under the provisions of this Code. However, minor 
alterations may be made subject to written approval of the Planning Commission 
and the date for completion may be extended by the Planning Commission. During 
the build-out of the planned unit development, the Planning Commission may 
authorize minor adjustments to the approved Final Development Plan pursuant to 
the provisions for modifications to an approved site plan, when such adjustments 
appear necessary in light of technical or engineering considerations. Such minor 
adjustments shall be limited to the following elements: 
 (a) Adjusting the distance as shown on the approved final Development Plan 
between any one structure or group of structures, and any other structure or group of 
structures, or any vehicular circulation element or any boundary of the site; 
 (b) Adjusting the location of any open space. The size or amount of open space 
that was approved shall not be compromised. 
 (c) Adjusting any final grade, and 
(d) Altering the types of landscaping elements and their arrangement within the 
required landscaping buffer area. 
(2) Such minor adjustments shall be consistent with the intent and purpose of the Code 
and the Final Development Plan as approved pursuant to this Section, and shall be 
the minimum necessary to overcome the particular difficulty and shall not be 
approved if such adjustments would result in a violation of any standard or 
requirement of this Code.  
(3) Any adjustment to the approved Final Development Plan not authorized by this 
Section, shall be considered to be a major adjustment. The Planning Commission 
following notice to at least all adjoining property owners, may approve an 
application for a major adjustment of the Final Development Plan, not requiring a 
modification of written conditions of approval or recorded easements, upon finding 
that any changes in the plan as approved will be in substantial conformity to the 
final Development Plan. If the Planning Commission determines that a major 
adjustment is not in substantial conformity with the Final Development Plan as 
approved, then the Planning Commission shall review the request in accordance 
with the procedures set forth in Section 12.4. 
 




